MITIGATING INADVERTENT INSIDER THREATS WITH INCENTIVES

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Insiders

- within an organization
- with legitimate access to organizational resources
- e.g. an employee, contractor, consultant, or any person who has a relationship with or position of trust within the organization

Statistics

- US companies lose 5% of their annual revenues to internal fraud ¹
- Half of survey participants experienced an insider incident ²
- 80% of publicized data breaches ³
- 91% of global financial services firms were concerned about insider threats 4
- \$7.2 billion in fraudulent trades by a rogue insider 5

Insider Type

Malicious Insiders

- the individuals with varying degrees of malicious intent to cause harm
- motivated by seeking profit

Inadvertent Insiders

- do not have malicious intent
- do not responsibly manage security
- most IT experts agree that most leaks of information and security breaches are not criminal but the result of accidents and human errors ⁶

Research Goal

- Design a risk management mechanism using incentive engineering
 - align incentives between users and organization
 - encourage the users to self-manage their risks
 - discourage the users against risky actions
 - mitigate the inadvertent insider threats

Scenario

- An inadvertent insider
- Use company resources
- Download a football screensaver
- Two websites with different risk rating
- Warning pop-up for the risky website
- Inadvertent insider only motivated by his personal gain

Core Problem

- Risk communication not effective
- The incentives are incorrectly aligned for the inadvertent insider
 - incentive engineering
 - shift the cost of risk

Risk Budget Mechanism

- Every user is assigned a bucket of risk points
- A risky activity will cost him some points
- User gets punishment, if
 - run out of budget before having task done
- Or user gets reward, if
 - job done before using up his points
 - the more points surplus the more rewards

Budget Assignment

- Budget size determined
 - by the organization
 - based on
 - task description
 - organization's preference
 - user's access rights
 - user's security preference
- Budget size implies a risk limit

Points Payment

- Inadvertent insiders only take actions based on their privileges and access
- Organization knows all the possible actions a user can take
- Organization can associate a risk rating with each action

Punishments

- An incentive against risk-seeking behaviors
- Enforced by the organization
- Triggered by the risk budget exhaustion
- In the form of
 - an audit
 - a mandatory training program
 - a loss of access
- Translate exhausted budget into a cost

Rewards

- A measure to reward the user
 - The fewer risk points consumed the more rewards the user will get
- In the form of
 - more access
 - monetary award
 - symbolic award
 - welfare
 - accumulated
 - redeem

In Practice

An employee

- Internet surfing
- documents downloading
 - a daily risk budget B
 - spend p_j to visit a website w_j that costs p_k to perform the downloading
 - spend p'_j to visit another website w'_j that costs p'_k to download
 - p_j , p_k , p_j and p_k are set by the organization based on its perception and evaluation of potential risks
 - $\overline{}$ assuming $B > (p_j + p_k) > (p'_j + p'_k)$
 - we expect she voluntarily chooses the second website, which incurs lower risks, under our risk budget mechanism

Experimental Configuration

- Two human-subject experiments
 - based on a firefox browser extension
- The 1st experiment
 - as benchmark
 - to understand users' risk behaviors
- The 2nd experiment
 - to study the change of risk behaviors

Recruitment

- 40 participants
- Voluntarily recruited from the undergraduates at Indiana University
- Randomly and equally divided into two group
- None of them have majors in computer related fields


Task Descriptions

- Search for the websites offering free screen savers downloads from the web
- 2. From the search results, choose five websites: website-1, website-2, website-3, website-4 and website-5
- 3. From website-1, please take a screenshot of an animal screensaver
- 4. From website-2, please take a screenshot of a nature screensaver
- 5. From website-3, please take a screenshot of a sport screensaver
- 6. From website-4, please take a screenshot of a space screensaver.
- 7. From website-5, please take a screenshot of a flower screensaver.
- 8. Thank you. You have completed the experiment

Website Rating

- Those that have been previously visited are trusted
- Those that have not been previously visited are considered untrusted
- The ratings of an untrusted website comes from McAfee SiteAdvisor


Experiment One



Experiment Two

- 20 participants completed the same task under the additional constraint of their risk budgets
- If they successfully accomplished their tasks
 - receive \$10 plus a bonus
 - bonus based on the remaining risk points
- If any participant exhausted a risk budget
 - compensation forfeited
- If any participant failed to complete the experiment in time allowed
 - compensation forfeited

Experiment Two




Firefox Browser Extension


- 1. Detect a new page being loaded;
- 2. Check the domain name of a webpage;
- Maintain a list of target high risk websites and their reputations;
- Pop up a warning message when a high risk website was about to be visited;
- 5. Ask for confirmation or rejection of the visit choice from the participant;
- 6. Record the experimental results;
 - (In experiment two, the extension also took the following actions:)
- 7. Generate a price based on a website's reputation;
- 8. Track participants risk budgets balance.


Data

- 1st experiment
 - 104 pop-up warning messages
 - 81 risk-seeking decisions
 - 23 risk-averse decisions
- 2nd experiment
 - 106 pop-up warning messages
 - 11 risk-seeking decisions
 - 95 risk-averse decisions

Risk Behaviors







Risk Boundary

- 2nd experiment
 - 11 risk-seeking behavior responses
 - average payment was 16 pts
- 1st experiment
 - assuming 16 pts cost
 - 20% participants could exhaust their budget
- Incentives
 - effectively motivate users against abuse of their privileges
 - help establishes a boundary for organization

Regulation Friction

- Regulation friction
 - the efforts made by the users to adopt a risk-averse strategy instead of a risk-seeking strategy
- Measured this regulation friction using time interval for completing the task
 - 1st experiment 5:45
 - 2nd experiment 6:00
 - Regulation friction of 4.3% of the time committed in experiment one

Game Theoretic Analysis

	Risk-Seeking	Risk-Averse
No Reward	$(-P_1, 0)$	(-P ₂ , -C)
Reward	$(-P_1-R_1, R_1)$	$(-P_2-R_2, R_2-C)$

- \blacksquare P_1 : the cost to the organization when a risk-seeking adopted
- \blacksquare P_2 : the cost to the organization when a risk-averse adopted
- $P_1 > P_2$
- \blacksquare R_1 : the reward to the user when a risk-seeking strategy is adopted
- \blacksquare R_2 : the reward to the user when a risk-averse strategy is adopted
- \blacksquare $R_1 < \overline{R_2}$
- *C*: the friction between the risk-seeking and the risk-averse strategy

Game Solution and Application

- \blacksquare $R_1 < R_2 C$ must hold
- (reward, risk averse) as equilibrium strategy in the repeated game
- It's critical to determine the parameters
 - C could be estimated from time difference observation
 - adjust the incentive functions and monitor the risks, until the risk behavior distribution becomes acceptable

Conclusion and Future Work

- Inadvertent insiders pose a grave security threat
- we propose a risk budget mechanism that encourages insiders to behave in a manner aligned with interest of the organization
- experiment results
 - impacts on rational users' risk attitudes
 - evidently shifts their behaviors

■ in the future

- study the effectiveness of our approach beyond the scenario of web browsing
- explore the possibility of combining the idea of risk budgeting with existing access control mechanisms

References

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Thank you for your time!

Questions?